The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles by Streib, Victor L.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1986
The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment
of Juveniles
Victor L. Streib
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Victor L. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 363 (1985-1986)
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
OF JUVENILES
VICTOR L. STREIB*
I. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE .......................... 365
A. United States Supreme Court Rulings .............. 365
B. Specific Statutory Provisions ..................... 368
C. Lower Court Cases ............................. 371
D. Past Executions and Present Sentences .............. 376
II. UNIQUE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR JUVENILES .............. 377
III. EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE ....................... 378
A. History and Precedent .......................... 379
B. Legislative Attitudes ............................ 381
C. Jury Sentencing Patterns ........................ 383
D. Contemporary Standards of Decency ............... 388
IV. MEASUREABLE CONTRIBUTION TO GOALS OF PUNISHMENT ........... 390
A . R etribution ................................... 391
B. General Deterrence ............................. 392
C. Specific Deterrence and Incapacitation .............. 394
D. Reformation, Rehabilitation, and Treatment ......... 395
V. ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND FREAKISH MANNER ................ 395
VI. AGE EIGHTEEN IS MOST APPROPRIATE ..................... 397
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................... 398
T he practice of imposing the death penalty for crimes committed while
under the age of eighteen has occurred sporadically but persistently
throughout American history. It gives every indication of continuing in
this mode under current law and practice, having been manifested most
recently with the execution of Jay Kelly Pinkerton on May 15, 1986.1
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
The author wishes to express his great appreciation for the most helpful comments and
suggestions by Mr. Randall F. Kender, an outstanding law student at Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law at the time this article was being written.
Current research indicates that a total of 281 such juveniles have been executed in
American history from 1642 through 1986. This research was first published as Streib,
Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes
Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613 (1983), which reported 287
documented cases. Subsequent research has reduced that number to 281 documented cases-
See Streib, Persons Executed for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen (July
1986)(unpublished research paper, available from author).
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Greatly differing approaches are followed by the various states as to
the authorization and imposition of capital punishment for juveniles.2
This article explores the existence of a constitutionally-mandated mini-
mum age below which the states may not venture in carrying out this
practice. 3 If such a nationwide minimum age exists or should exist, its
justification can be found in current interpretations of the eighth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
As the next section of this article documents, the practice of capital
punishment of juveniles has been rare but not so rare that it can be
ignored. The remainder of this article considers, point by point, the
factors deemed important by the United States Supreme Court in
determining whether capital punishment is prohibited by the eighth
amendment. A fundamental theme is the mistake of uncritically trans-
ferring constitutionality conclusions from adult capital offender cases to
juvenile capital offender cases. Justice Frankfurter's observation per-
vades this analysis: "Children [have] a very special place in life which the
law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases
readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to deter-
mination of a State's duty toward children."4 On the precise issue of
juvenile crime, it is "unrealistic to treat young offenders as if they have
fully mature judgment and control." Thus, when examining the law and
The first documented case was that of Thomas Graunger, age sixteen, executed in 1642 in
Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts, for bestiality. N. TEETERS & J. HEDBLOM, " . . . HANG BY THE
NECK ..." 111 (1967). Prior to the current era of the death penalty (1977 - present), the last
juvenile execution was that of James Echols in Texas on May 7, 1964, for a rape committed
when he was only seventeen. Echols v. State, 370 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963)(af-
firming conviction and death sentence); W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE 512 (1984)(reporting
execution).
After a twenty-one year hiatus in juvenile executions, Texas executed Charles Rumbauch
on September 11, 1985, for a robbery and murder committed when he was only seventeen.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at 11, col. 4. James Terry Roach was executed by South Carolina
on January 10, 1986. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at 7, col. 1. The last juvenile execution as
of this writing was of Jay Kelly Pinkerton in Texas on May 15, 1986. N.Y. Times, May 16,
1986, at 11, col. 1.
' The term "juveniles" is used to denote that category of offenders who committed their
capital crimes while under the age of eighteen. The term bears this meaning throughout
this article for the sake of brevity and continuity.
I The argument for this concept was made first and most eloquently by Jay Baker,
attorney for Monty Lee Eddings, in his now-classic Brief for Petitioner at 18-59, Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). His brief has been the basis for many subsequent briefs and
articles. A well-done and persuasive piece arguing the opposite position of this article is
Hill, Can the Death Penalty be Imposed on Juveniles: The Unanswered Question in Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1984). Among the several student pieces, the most
complete exposition of these issues appears in Note, Capital Punishment for Minors: An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471 (1983).
4 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
' TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS,
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978).
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practice of capital punishment, juveniles traditionally have not been, and
should not be, treated the same as adults for this or any other legal
purpose.
I. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE
Although the issue of the constitutionality of capital punishment for
juveniles has never been decided directly by the United States Supreme
Court,6 various facets of the legality of this practice have been considered
by that Court as well as many other courts and legislatures. Before
turning to the precise constitutional issues involved, this general legal
context should be understood. The other essential background context is
the actual practice of capital punishment of juveniles, provided later in
this section.
A. United States Supreme Court Rulings
The Court's attention to the capital punishment issue during the past
fifteen years is well-known and widely reported, although the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment had never been seriously questioned by
the Court prior to this period.7 Beginning in 1972, the Court produced
several landmark opinions which completely reinterpreted and restated
this area of law.
Furman v. Georgia8 was the first of these cases. Furman, with its ten
separate opinions and 232 total pages, overwhelmed most observers, but
left many of the critical issues in capital punishment unresolved. The
Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied in the
particular cases then before it, but failed to decide whether such punish-
ment was unconstitutional for all crimes and under all circumstances. 9
The Court's holding in Gregg v. Georgia1° launched the current era. In
Gregg, a majority of the Court held that the death penalty does not
violate per se the eighth amendment.1 While the issue was not specifi-
cally before the Court in Gregg, the concern for the age of the offender
emerged even in this case. The Court approved the Georgia statute's
guided discretion for the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigat-
6 The Court, over the strong dissent of Justice Brennan, again refused to address this
issue when it denied certiorari in Roach v. Aiken, 106 S. Ct. 645 (1986). See also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 407-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 428
(Powell, J., dissenting).
8 408 U.S 238 (1972).
9 Id.
10 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion), id. at 226 (White, J., concurring).
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ing factors in the sentencing hearing. 12 In passing, the Court approved
the requirement that the jury consider the offender's characteristics,
including such hypothetical questions as the following: "Are there any
special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital
punishment (e.g., his youth .... )?"13 In a companion case to Gregg, the
Court approved a Texas statute which provided that the sentencing jury
"could further look to the age of the defendant"' 4 in deciding between life
imprisonment and the death sentence.
In subsequent cases, the Court continued to favor guided discretion
statutes, such as those approved in Gregg, and to reject the mandatory
death penalty statutes. In Roberts v. Louisiana,15 the Court found
unconstitutional a statute which dictated mandatory capital punishment
for the killing of a police officer. Stressing the need to consider mitigating
circumstances in all capital punishment cases, the Court once again
expressly mentioned the youth of the offender as an appropriate mitigat-
ing factor and noted its relevance in many jurisdictions. 16
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided two cases from Ohio which made
clear the requirement that sentencing juries and judges consider all
mitigating factors proferred by the defendant, including the youth of the
offender. The lead decision of Lockett v. Ohio17 held that such unlimited
consideration of mitigating factors was constitutionally required, in part
because without such a requirement under the Ohio statute, "consider-
ation of defendant's comparatively minor role in the offense, or age,
would generally not be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing
decision."'
The companion case to Lockett was Bell v. Ohio,'9 in which the appellant
was only sixteen years old at the time of the murder for which he was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.20 At the sentencing
hearing, Bell's attorney had argued that Bell's youth should be con-
sidered as a mitigating factor; however, the Ohio statute prohibited
introduction of any mitigating factors beyond those few expressly per-
mitted. The Supreme Court reversed Bell's death sentence, relying upon
the reasoning and requirements expressed in Lockett.21 The Court did not
address Bell's contention that the death penalty was disproportionate as
12 Id. at 196-98 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
13 Id. at 197.
14 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion)(quoting with
approval Jurek v. Texas, 522 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
15 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
e Id. at 637.
17 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
18 Id. at 608.
19 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
20 Id. at 639.
21 Id, at 642-43.
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applied in his case (an argument that presumably would have stressed
Bell's youthful age) since the case had already been resolved under the
Lockett reasoning. 22
A few years later, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the specific issue
of the constitutionality of capital punishment for an offense committed
when the defendant was only sixteen years old.23 In its final holding,
however, the Eddings Court avoided that constitutionality issue and sent
the case back for resentencing after full consideration of all mitigating
factors per the Lockett holding.24 On the issue of the offender's youth, the
Court observed:
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronolog-
ical fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors,
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and
responsible than adults. Particularly 'during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment' expected of adults.25
In the five-to-four Eddings decision, the majority avoided deciding the
constitutionality issue;26 in contrast and rebuke, Chief Justice Burger
dissented and found no constitutional bar to the death penalty for this
sixteen-year-old's crime.27 Chief Justice Burger's dissent was joined by
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White. Therefore, at least four mem-
bers of the Court would have decided the issue at that time, to the
detriment of young Monty Lee Eddings.
Since Eddings, the Supreme Court has been asked repeatedly to
consider the constitutionality issue; thus far, those requests have been
regularly rejected. 28 The determination of the legality of capital punish-
ment for juveniles is thus left to individual jurisdictions. The only
constitutional mandate is that each jurisdiction must permit the sentenc-
ing jury and/or judge to consider the youth of the offender as a mitigating
factor. This article now considers struggles of the various jurisdictions
and some of their decisions concerning this troublesome issue.
22 Id. at 642-43 n.*.
23 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
24 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117.
25 Id. at 115-16 (footnotes omitted).
26 See id. at 119 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
2 See, e.g., Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 645
(1986); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1231
(1985); Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 105 . Ct. 1209 (1985);
High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693, 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2669 (1984);
Tokman v. State, 435 So. 2d 664 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3574 (1984).
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B. Specific Statutory Provisions
The federal capital punishment statute has been under a considerable
cloud since Furman and Gregg were decided because many of its
provisions conflict with the principles established in those cases.29 A new
federal bill which would establish an apparently valid federal capital
punishment statute requiring a minimum age of eighteen at the time of
the crime is now pending before the Senate, but has been stalled in
previous years in the United States House of Representatives.3- Although
President Reagan expressed his support of a new federal capital punish-
ment law in his state of the union address on February 6, 1985,3 1 the bill
has not yet passed; and no new comprehensive federal death penalty
statute seems likely to be adopted in the near future.
Within the fifty states and the District of Columbia, the statutory law
seems fairly well settled. Fifteen of these fifty-one jurisdictions have no
capital punishment statutes and none in the offing. 32 These fifteen juris-
dictions do not execute anyone, including juveniles. Fourteen other states
have capital punishment statutes which expressly prohibit such punish-
ment for juveniles. 33 Ten states set the minimum age at eighteen. 34 Three
21 Current federal statutes authorize the death penalty for a variety of crimes. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C.A. § 1111 (West 1969)(murder); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2031 (West 1969)(rape); 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2113 (West 1969)(bank robbery). However, they do not provide for the guided discretion in
sentencing required by the Supreme Court in Gregg and thus are clearly unconstitutional.
No persons are presently under a sentence of death for violation of federal laws.
"0 S. REP. No. 239, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3591 (1986). An amendment placed in the
original bill states "that no person may be sentenced to death who was less than eighteen
years of age at the time of the offense." Id. This bill as amended was ordered out of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on February 20, 1986, and placed on the Senate's legislative
calendar on April 16, 1986. I CONG. INDEX 20,501 (1985-86).
" See N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, at 13, col. 4.
32 Alaska (none since 1957); District of Columbia (none since 1973); Hawaii (none since
1957); Iowa (none since 1965); Kansas (none since 1973); Maine (none since 1887);
Massachusetts (none since 1984); Michigan (none since 1963); Minnesota (none since 1911);
New York (none since 1985); North Dakota (none since 1957); Rhode Island (none since
1979); Vermont (pre-Furman statute still in the code but clearly invalid); West Virginia
(none since 1965); Wisconsin (none since 1853).
" California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1986)); Colorado (COLo. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-103 (Supp. 1985)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(1)(West 1985));
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-3 (1982)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b)(Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (1982)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 176.025 (1979)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (II)(b)(5)(Supp. 1983)); New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3f (West 1986)(P.L. 1985, ch. 4780 approved Jan. 17, 1986));
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14A (1979)); Ohio (Oujo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.03(E)(Page 1982)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 161 (1985)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-134(1)(1984)); Texas (TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d)(Vernon Supp. 1985)).
" California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oregon and Tennessee. Id.
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use age seventeen as the minimum 35 and Nevada uses age sixteen as the
minimum.3 6
In addition to the fourteen states which set a minimum age in their
capital punishment statutes, thirteen other states establish a minimum
age limit through other statutory means. One way is to give exclusive
original jurisdiction over juvenile crime to their juvenile courts and then
to establish a minimum age for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
and transfer to adult criminal court. Only if a juvenile meets or exceeds
this minimum age can s/he be prosecuted for a capital crime in criminal
court and thus be in jeopardy of receiving capital punishment. Eight
states follow this manner of establishing a minimum age for capital
punishment.37 Four of these states38 use age fourteen. Virginia uses age
fifteen, Mississippi age thirteen, Montana age twelve, and Indiana age
ten.
39
The other statutory method for establishing a minimum age for capital
punishment is to give concurrent or exclusive original jurisdiction to an
adult criminal court if the crime is capital murder and the defendant is of
a certain age or older. Five states follow this procedure.40 Arkansas,
Idaho, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania use age fourteen while Louisi-
ana uses age fifteen.41
Another group of six states has no minimum age limits in either capital
punishment statutes or the juvenile court statutes but specifically and
expressly list the age of the offender as a mitigating factor in capital
punishment statutes. 42 These six states must allow evidence proferred by
the defendant on any mitigating circumstance, including youthfulness of
5 Georgia, New Hampshire and Texas. See supra note 33.
3 See supra note 33. This list was comprised of fifteen states including Kentucky.
Kentucky repealed its new juvenile code in 1984 due to funding problems. That code, passed
originally in 1980, prohibited capital punishment for juveniles under age eighteen. KY. REV.
STAT, § 208F.040 (1980)(repealed 1984).
"7 Alabama (ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(a)(1977)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-4(c)(Burns
Supp. 1982)); Kentucky (Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 208E.070(2)(Baldwin 1980)); Mississippi
(MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151 (1985)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (Vernon Supp.
1985)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-5-206 (1985)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-25
(1)(Supp. 1983)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269(A)(1982)).
38 Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri and Utah. Id.
31 See supra note 7.
40 Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-61712)(Supp. 1985)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A-1
(Supp. 1984)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570(A)(5)(West 1983)); North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1981)); Pennsylvania (PA. CODE STAT. § 6355(a)(1)(1982)).
41 Id.
42 Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(5)(Supp. 1985)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(6)(g)(West Supp. 1984)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 413(g)(5)(Supp.
1985)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(b)(7)(1985)); Washington (WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.070(7)(Supp. 1986)); Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102)j)(vii) 1977 Repub. ed.,
(Repl. 1983)).
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the offender. 43 Additionally, they have statutorally specified age of the
offender as one of those mitigating factors to be considered.
The remaining three jurisdictions have valid capital punishment
statutes and permit mitigating factors to be considered; however, they
have not listed expressly and specifically the age of the offender as a
mitigating factor in their statutes.44 In these states the defendant may
offer his or her youthfulness as a mitigating factor, but this specific factor
is not mentioned in the capital punishment statute and no minimum age
is set forth in any other statute.
Table 1 arrays the thirty-six capital punishment states according to
their establishment, by whatever means, of a minimum age of the
offender at the time of the offense for eligibility for capital punishment.
No minimum age whatsoever is established in nine of these capital
punishment states.
TABLE 1
MINIMUM AGE OF OFFENDER REQUIRED BY
THIRTY-SIX CAPITAL PUNISHMENT JURISDICTIONS
Age at
Offense jurisdiction Total
10: Indiana 1
12: Montana 1
13: Mississippi 1
14: Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, 8
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania and Utah
15: Louisiana and Virginia 2
16: Nevada 1
17: Ceorgia, New Hampshire and Texas 3
18: California, Colorado, Connecticut, ]O
Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oregon and Tennessee
No Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, 9
Minimum: Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
lshington and Wyoming
Total: 36
a Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536 (1978).
44 Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(1974 Rev. ed., Repl. 1979)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.01 (West 1983)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1984)).
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Of the twenty-seven states which establish a minimum age, ten use age
eighteen directly in their capital punishment statutes. Eight states have
established age fourteen as the minimum resulting from their juvenile
court waiver statutes and/or through their exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction provisions. While this practice operates to establish a mini-
mum age for capital punishment, it more precisely sets a minimum age
for criminal court jurisdiction in general. Apparently, no specific consid-
eration was given to the narrower issue of a minimum age for capital
punishment. The rest of the twenty-seven states' statutes contain mini-
mum ages scattered throughout the ages often, twelve, thirteen, fifteen,
sixteen, and seventeen. Of course, all states which have capital punish-
ment statutes must allow youthfulness of the offender as a mitigating
factor. 45
C. Lower Court Cases
Case law in these fifty-one jurisdictions has developed in a fairly
inconsistent fashion. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Eddings,
several state supreme courts addressed the issue of severe criminal
punishments for juveniles. A case often cited is Workman v. Common-
wealth46 in which a fourteen-year-old boy was sentenced to life in prison,
without possibility for parole, for the crime of rape. The Kentucky
Supreme Court found such severe criminal punishment to be cruel and
unusual under the Kentucky Constitution when applied to a juvenile. 47
Other state cases have dealt directly with capital punishment for
juveniles. State v. Stewart48 was a Nebraska case decided under the
then-new Nebraska statute which provided for age of the offender as only
one of several mitigating factors to be considered. The court interpreted
the statutory provision as applicable to a sixteen-year-old offender and, in
combination with the absence of any significant criminal record, to
"mitigate strongly against the imposition of the death penalty."49 The
Nebraska Supreme Court reduced the juvenile's sentence from death to
life imprisonment.
Lewis v. State50 also dealt with a sixteen-year-old offender sentenced to
death for murdering a police officer in the course of a robbery. This case
arose prior to the current amendment to the Georgia statute which
prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed while under age
seventeen. 51 The case was reversed on a juror-selection issue but is of
" Eddings, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. 536 (1978).
46 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
47 Id. at 378.
48 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
49 Id. at 526, 250 N.W.2d at 866.
50 246 Ga. 101, 268 S.E.2d 915 (1980).
51 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-3 (1982).
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importance to this analysis for the comments found in a concurring
opinion. Noting that only one sixteen-year-old had been sentenced to
death under Georgia's 1973 statute (the case had been reversed for jury
instruction errors), the concurring justice opined "that the death penalty
has been so rarely imposed upon persons under 17 as to make the death
sentence in this case excessive and disproportionate and hence unconsti-
tutional."5 2 Soon thereafter, the Georgia legislature amended the Geor-
gia capital punishment statute to put the minimum age at seventeen.
The final pre-Eddings case worthy of mention is People v. Davis.5 3 Like
Workman, the Davis case concluded that life imprisonment without
possibility of parole should not be imposed for crimes committed while
under the age of eighteen. The California court in Davis read that
exclusion for juveniles into a fairly vague state and opted, as did the
Kentucky court in Workman, to prohibit such a harsh criminal sanction
for juveniles. These four pre-Eddings cases are only selected examples of
the many cases decided along similar lines.54
Eddings v. Oklahoma5 5 was decided by the United States Supreme
Court on January 19, 1982, and subsequently has been relied upon by
many lower courts. As was discussed earlier, the Court in Eddings
reaffirmed that youth of the offender is a mitigating factor of great
weight which must be considered although the Court avoided any direct
holding on the constitutionality of capital punishment of juveniles.56
However, several lower courts have devined more from the Eddings
holding than seems reasonable.
Cases such as High v. Zant5 7 and State v. Battle58 have cited Eddings as
holding that capital punishment for juveniles is not per se cruel and
52 Lewis, 246 Ga. at 107, 268 S.E.2d at 921 (Hill, J., concurring).
53 29 Cal. 3d 814, 633 P.2d 186, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1981).
' See, e.g., Bracewell v. State, 401 So, 2d 124 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980)("[W]e would
likewise direct the trial court to carefully reconsider the imposition of the death penalty
where two mitigating circumstances weight heavily in the appellant's favor, i.e., her young
age and the dominance of her husband .. " Id. at 125.); State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348,
464 P.2d 793, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970)('The defendant has committed a heinous
crime.... Had he been of mature age the death penalty would have gone undisturbed by
this Court .... Because of his immaturity [age 15] we are persuaded that he should not
die .... "Id. at 360, 464 P.2d at 805.); Vasil v. State, 374 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 967 (1980)(court reduced 15-year-old's death sentence); Coleman v. State, 378 So.
2d 640 (Miss. 1979)(court reduced 16-year-old's death sentence); Commonwealth v. Green,
396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959)(court vacated a 15-year-old's death sentence because "age
is an important factor in determining the appropriateness of the penalty and should impose
upon the sentencing court the duty to be ultra vigilant in its inquiry into the makeup of the
convicted murderer." Id. at 147, 151 A.2d at 246).
5 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
se See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
57 250 Ga. 693, 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2669 (1984).
58 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1983)(en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2325 (1984).
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unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. This propo-
sition is, of course, precisely the issue presented to and avoided by the
Supreme Court in Eddings, much to the dissatisfaction of Chief Justice
Burger writing in dissent.59 The state courts in High and Battle, which
have interpreted Eddings as such, may have been assuming that holding
that youthfulness of the offender is a mitigating factor of great weight
includes the premise that capital punishment of such youthful offenders
is not a per se violation of the eighth amendment. However, no reasonably
objective reading of Eddings can permit this assumption, particularly in
light of Justice O'Connor's observation in her concurring opinion: "I,
however, do not read the Court's opinion . . . as deciding the issue of
whether the Constitution permits imposition of the death penalty on an
individual who committed a murder at age 16."60
Most lower courts have agreed that Eddings did not settle the consti-
tutionality issue, but some have gone on to decide that issue themselves.
Two illustrative cases are Prejean v. Blackburn6 1 and Trimble v. State.6 2
The Prejean court interpreted the eighth amendment as focusing on the
kind of punishment, and not the characteristics of the offender, as long as
the punishment is not the result of bias or prejudice. Thus, the constitu-
tionality claim of Dalton Prejean, age seventeen at the time of his crime,
was found to be "without merit".63
In Trimble, the offender had been seventeen years and eight months
old at the time he brutally kidnapped, raped and killed the victim. 4 He
appealed his death sentence to the Maryland Supreme Court, claiming,
among other issues, that the United States Constitution prohibited
capital punishment for crimes committed while under age eighteen.65
The Maryland court noted that Eddings left this question open but that
the issue could be resolved from reference to other Supreme Court cases
on the constitutionality of capital punishment.66
The Trimble court's analysis of other lower court cases led it to observe
that no other court had found a constitutional bar to capital punishment
of juveniles.67 The Trimble court concluded that indicators of society's
evolving standards of decency did not reject this punishment for Trimble
because it was authorized by the Maryland legislature as one of "29
states [that] permit the execution of juveniles in some circumstances." 68
" Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 128 (1982)(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 119 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61 570 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. La. 1983), affd, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984).
62 300 Md. 387, 478 A.2d 1143 (1984).
63 Prejean, 570 F. Supp. at 999.
64 Trimble, 300 Md. at 387, 478 A.2d at 1146.
65 Brief for Appellant at 41-54, Trimble, 300 Md. at 387, 478 A.2d at 1143.
66 Trimble, 300 Md. at 417, 478 A.2d at 1158.
67 Id. at 420, 478 A.2d at 1160.
68 Id. at 421, 478 A.2d at 1161.
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This strong legislative endorsement outweighed apparent jury reluc-
tance to sentence juveniles to death, the prohibition of this punishment
by most countries throughout the world, and the significant body of
scholarly thought that rejects capital punishment for juveniles.69 The
Trimble court also concluded that the penological goals of retribution
and deterrence would be served by execution of juveniles so this sentence
was not excessive or disproportionate. It held that the eighth
amendment did not prohibit execution of young Mr. Trimble, and
adopted a case-by-case approach to future cases of capital punishment for
juveniles7 °
A third approach to interpreting Eddings is exemplified by cases such
as Cannaday v. State.71 In Cannaday, the Mississippi Supreme Court
noted that the United States Supreme Court had not found capital
punishment of juveniles to be unconstitutional, but avoided attempting
its own eighth amendment analysis. The court reversed Attina Can-
naday's death sentence on other grounds but expressly excluded the
eighth amendment as a basis for that reversal.72 The Cannaday approach
is supported by cases such as Ice v. Commonwealth73 and Tokman v.
State.74 The Tokman opinions are particularly revealing in that they
suggest considerable reluctance of the Mississippi Supreme Court to
allow capital punishment of juveniles. The majority opinion found no
constitutional grounds for prohibiting capital punishment for a crime by
a seventeen-year-old but observed: "I find it deeply disturbing that the
life of a youth should be taken in punishment for his crime, the
justification for it being that it is the law of this state which dictates the
result if due process is afforded." 75 The dissenting judge would have gone
further, believing that the defendant's youth and background provided
the basis for reversing the death sentence and imposing a sentence of life
imprisonment.7 6
A final group of state court cases has placed strong emphasis upon the
great mitigating weight accorded the defendant's youth, as required by the
Eddings case, finding this factor to be so compelling that the death sen-
tence must be reversed. State v. Valencia77 is a leading example of this
group of cases. The offender was only sixteen when the murder was com-
mitted but was sentenced to death by the trial court three successive times
69 See infra notes 105-161 and accompanying text for a discussion of all of the factors
which should be considered in assessing society's evolving standards of decency.
70 Trimble, 300 Md. at 428, 478 A.2d at 1164.
71 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984).
72 Id. at 725.
73 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984).
74 435 So. 2d 664 (Miss. 1983)(Hawkins, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 672.
76 Id. at 674 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
77 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982).
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despite intervening sentence reversals by the appellate courts.78 Finally,
the Arizona Supreme Court set aside the death penalty and ordered that
young Valencia be sentenced to life imprisonment. 79 The Valencia court
did not rule out capital punishment for all juveniles but concluded that age
of the offender was "a substantial and relevant factor which must be given
great weight."8 0 The clear impression from the case is that only the most
extraordinary facts would justify capital punishment of a juvenile.
This concept is further exemplified by the dissent in Magill v. State.8 '
Florida, the state with the largest death row population in the nation,
decided to uphold the death sentence for the seventeen-year-old Magill,
the only juvenile on Florida's death row. The rarity and disconcerting
effect of this decision was manifested in the dissent:
Appellant's age should have been given greater weight in
mitigation.... This court has thus far vacated the death sentence
of every defendant who has been under the age of eighteen....
That is not to suggest that the death penalty should never be
imposed on a minor. However, because of society's great concern
for its juveniles, great significance should be attached to the fact
that a person accused of a capital felony is a minor, especially a
minor who is unemancipated.8 2
Another case following in the line of Valencia and the Magill dissent is
Harvey v. State.s3 The Harvey court also gave very great weight to the
offender's youthful age. Based upon that and other mitigating factors, the
court found the death sentence disproportionate in his case. This appor-
tionment of such great weight to the youth of the offender has been
manifested in many other cases as well.84
The lower court decisions split in at least four directions. Some have
erroneously assumed that Eddings decided the constitutionality issue for
capital punishment of juveniles. Others have agreed that Eddings left
that question undecided and went on to decide the issue themselves, to
the detriment of the young offenders before them. A third group has
relegated the matter totally to their legislatures, finding no restrictions
from Eddings or any other source. The last group has focused upon the
Eddings observation that youthfulness of the offender is to be given great
" State v. Valencia, 121 Ariz. 191, 589 P.2d 434 (1979); State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139,
602 P.2d 807 (1979); State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982).
'9 Valencia, 132 Ariz. at 250, 645 P.2d at 242.
so Id. at 249, 645 P.2d at 241.
"' 428 So. 2d 649 (Fla.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 198 (1983).
12 Id. at 654 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
83 682 P.2d 1384 (1984). Nevada's minimum age for capital punishment is 16 but
defendant Harvey was 16 at the time of his robbery and murder. See NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 176.025 (1979).
'" See supra note 54.
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weight as a mitigating factor; such courts have gone on to find youth a
compelling reason in the case before them to reduce the juvenile's
sentence from the death penalty to a lesser penalty.
D. Past Executions and Present Sentences
Current research has identified about 15,000 legal executions in our
nation's history.8 5 At least 281 of them have been for crimes committed
while under age eighteen. 86 Executions of children have occurred from
1642 through 1986. The youngest of these executed children was age ten
at the time of his offense, with at least forty-eight children executed for
crimes committed while age fifteen or younger. Over two-thirds of all of
the children executed during this 240 year period were black. Only nine
of these 281 children were female; all nine were black or American
Indian.87
Executions of children have been much more common in some states
and regions than others. Thirty-six of the fifty states have executed
persons for crimes committed while under age eighteen, as have the
various federal jurisdictions. Georgia is by far the leader with forty
executions; thirty-eight of these executed Georgia children were black.
The southern region of the United States has accounted for 64% of all
juvenile executions. For the 281 cases, 70% of the offenders were black
and 90% of their victims were white.88
The data concerning juveniles currently under a sentence of death
reflect a somewhat different picture.89 Only thirty-two of the almost
1,800 persons on death row as of July 1, 1986, committed their crimes
while under age eighteen. Race of the offenders is fairly even, with fifteen
being white and seventeen being black. Only two are female. Two-thirds
of them were age seventeen at the time of their crimes, but five were age
sixteen and five were age fifteen.
This brief history of the practice of executing juveniles, along with the
current hodgepodge of statutory and case law, describes an American
socio-legal phenomenon of considerable concern and importance. How-
ever, the American legal environment containing this important phe-
nomenon is confused, highly variable and based upon the most question-
able of premises. The imposition of clear constitutional requirements
would aid in remedying this situation. The following is an analytic
framework for such a constitutional remedy.
8s5 J. Smykla, Four Centuries of Executions in America, An Examination of Executions
in America: The Espy File (Mar. 18, 1986)(Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences; Orlando, Fla.)(available from Professor John
Smykla, University of Alabama).
" See supra note 1.
87 Id.
88 Id.
s1 See infra Table 4 and accompanying text.
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II. UNIQUE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR JUVENILES
The Supreme Court has made clear its view of the unique harshness of
capital punishment holding that such a severe and irrevocable penalty
for crime must be subjected to the most stringent safeguards.90 One
category of such stringent safeguards has been the appropriateness of the
death penalty given the individual characteristics of the defendant. 91
Among the individual characteristics singled out for particular constitu-
tional scrutiny in capital punishment cases has been the youthful age of
the defendant.9 2
The Supreme Court has been quite willing to "assume juvenile offend-
ers constitutionally may be treated differently from adults."93 Manifes-
tations of this different treatment are limitations on youths' right to vote,
contract, purchase liquor, sue or be sued, dispose of property by will, serve
as jurors, enlist in the armed services, drive vehicles, marry, or accept
employment. 94 As Justice Frankfurter aptly noted, "[C]hildren have a
very special place in life which law should reflect."95
The fact that juveniles are less mature and less responsible than adults
is a premise often recognized by the Supreme court.96 Given the great
instability of adolescent behavior, they "cannot be judged by the more
exacting standards of maturity." 97
Due to this inherent immaturity and need for tailored governmental
response to their misbehavior, the unique and independent juvenile
justice system was established, in part, to liberate legally these children
from the harsh punishments of the criminal juvenile system. This
separate legal system for juveniles has been constitutionally domesti-
cated, nonetheless, it has been permitted to function in a unique manner
where justified by the special needs of the children it serves 9 8
The major thrust of the juvenile justice system is to treat and
rehabilitate the adolescents it serves.9 9 However, some persons who come
before the juvenile court, or who are within the age group covered by the
juvenile court's jurisdiction are deemed inappropriate candidates for the
9 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)(Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)(White, J., plurality opinion).
91 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
92 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982).
a Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
4 See, e.g., F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982).
95 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
9' See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16 (1982).
97 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
98 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
99 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 (1967).
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treatment and rehabilitative services which the state has to offer.100 For
these persons, chronologically labelled juveniles/children but situation-
ally labelled adults, the adult criminal justice system is imposed.1o1 This
denial of the benefits and protections of the juvenile justice system may
result from particular characteristics of the juvenile or from the lack of a
broad range of juvenile services available to the juvenile court in that
jurisdiction.10 2
Prosecution in the adult criminal courts subjects the juvenile to the
harshest of criminal sanctions, including capital punishment in many
jurisdictions.103 However, it cannot be assumed that these children are
now adults for all purposes under law simply because they find them-
selves in adult criminal court. They still cannot engage in adult activities
such as voting, contracting, marrying, or driving commercial vehicles.
Ironically, these juveniles are even prohibited from serving on a jury such
as the one trying them. Their adult-like acts which have placed them in
an adult criminal court are not justification for treating them as adults
for purpose of their constitutional and other legal rights. Their youth
continues to relegate them to a special category under law that case-
specific exclusion or expulsion from juvenile court cannot and does not
change.104
III. EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution forbids the
imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. This category of impermis-
sible punishments is not a static concept, but is to be re-examined "in light
of contemporary human knowledge."' 05 The eighth amendment "must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."106 Any criminal sanction "must accord
with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment'.' ' 10 7
100 See Kent v. United States, 366 U.S. 541 (1966).
10' See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
102 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544.
' "In some jurisdictions, the question of whether a 16-year-old accused of murder will
stay in juvenile court, or be tried in the criminal courts for a capital crime, will depend on
an individual judge assessing whether the 16-year-old is 'mature' and 'sophisticated.' If he
is found to be 'sophisticated,' his reward can be eligibility for the electric chair." F. ZIMRING,
supra note 94, at xii.
'04 See generally Note, Eddings v. Oklahoma: A Stay of Execution for Juveniles?, 9 NEW
ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 407 (1983).
'os Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
106 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(Warren, C.J., plurality opinion).
107 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion)(quoting
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))-
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Consideration of eighth amendment challenges to specific punishments
is to be provided by objective factors to the maximum possible extent:
"[A]ttention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular
sentence-history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response
of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted."108
To address these issues independently, the following subsections each
focus upon single issues. However, these factors should not be weighed
solely in isolation but should be combined in a final evaluation of the
acceptability of capital punishment of juveniles.
A. History and Precedent
The formal characterization of the juvenile justice system as a separate
system of law manifested a clear rejection of harsh, adult punishment for
the unlawful acts of children.10 9 The inappropriateness of harsh punish-
ments for youths was not a new concept; it had been an informal premise
of Anglo-American criminal justice systems prior to the beginning of the
juvenile justice system. While younger offenders may have not had de
jure benefit of less harsh punishments, research has indicated that they
did receive de facto benefits, such as shorter sentences, special incarcer-
ation facilities, community-based sanctions or outright commutation of
criminal sentences.'1 °
Capital punishment for such youths has always been rare."' Research
at England's Old Bailey revealed that over 100 youths had been sentenced
to death from 1801-1836 but none had actually been executed.11 2 Capital
punishment of juveniles was commonly avoided either by bringing only a
minor charge or by not prosecuting the youths at all.113 While some cases
do exist, it appears settled that execution of youths was never common in
England, at any time.'1 4 Since 1908, capital punishment has been pro-
hibited for crimes committed while under the age of sixteen in England.1 5
Capital punishment of juveniles has been similarly rare in the United
States." 6 Even when sentenced to death by a jury, there has been a very
high commutation rate for teenagers on death row.'1 7 The actual execu-
"' Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (White, J., plurality opinion).
109 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
110 See, e.g., Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970).
'' See generally J. LAURENCE, THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 16-18 (1960).
112 Knell, Capital Punishment: Its Administration in Relation to Juvenile Offenders in the
Nineteenth Century and Its Possible Administration in the Eighteenth, 5 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOCY
198, 199 (1965). England's Old Bailey is the primary criminal court in London, England.
l Id. at 202.
114 Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.
11. See, e.g., THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 52-56 (H. Bedau ed. 1964).
.17 Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey: 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25 (1964).
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TABLE 2
JUVENILE AN
Decade
1890s
1900s
1910s
1920s
1930s
1940s
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
Totals:
D TOTAL EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
BY DECADE, 1890s-1980s
Total
Executions
1,215
1,192
1,039
1,169
1,670
1,288
716
8,544
Juvenile
Executions
20
23
24
27
41
53
16
210
Percentage
1.6%
1.9%
2.3%
2.3%
2.5%
4.1%
2.2%
1.6%
0%
4.9%
2.5%
*Sources of data: W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE 54 (1984); Streib, Death
Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment
for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L_ REV. 613,630
(1983); NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row,
U.S.A. 4 (May 1, 1986); Streib, Persons Executed for Crimes Committed
While Under Age Eighteen (July 1986) (unpublished research paper,
available from author). Current as of July 24, 1986. An additional 71
juveniles were executed prior to 1890.
tion rate of juveniles for crimes committed while under age eighteen is
described in Table 2. Beginning with the 1890's, the total number of
juvenile executions each decade ranged from twenty to twenty-seven,
comprising about 1.6% to 2.3% of all executions. The number of all
executions then rose dramatically during the 1930's to 1,670 for the
decade; the number of juvenile executions also rose reaching a total of
forty-one, although still only 2.5% of the total.
The peak period for juvenile executions was in the 1940's. The total
number reached fifty-three and the percentage of all executions reached
4.1%. The United States was executing an average of 129 persons a year,
approximately five of whom had been under age eighteen at the time of
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their crimes. Following this decade, the number of total executions per
decade dropped precipitiously; juvenile executions dropped even more
dramatically. Only sixteen juveniles were executed in the 1950's (2.2% of
all executions) and only three juveniles were executed in the 1960's (1.6%
of all executions). Juvenile executions ended temporarily in 1964 with
the Texas execution of James Echols, age seventeen at the time of his
crime of rape." 58
All executions ended temporarily in 1967 with the execution of Luis
Monge in Colorado but resumed with the January 1977 execution of Gary
Gilmore in Utah. 11 9 Of the sixty-one executions from January 1977
through July 1986, only three have been juvenile executions, that of
Charles Rumbaugh in Texas on September 11, 1985, James Terry Roach
in South Carolina on January 10, 1986, and Jay Kelly Pinkerton in Texas
on May 15, 1986.120
B. Legislative Attitudes
It is settled in American law that young persons do not have the same
legal rights, responsibilities and liabilities as do adults. These special
legal categories for youths include rights to vote, contract, purchase
liquor, sue or be sued, dispose of property by will, serve as jurors, enlist
in the armed services, drive vehicles, marry, accept employment, and
many others.1 21
These special legislative attitudes toward youths are reflected most
vividly in the establishment of'juvenile justice systems within each state.
Youths within these juvenile justice systems receive special treatment
not available to adults and are not punished for their misdeeds in the
same manner as adults for similar acts. Thirty-eight states set age
eighteen as the age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction. 122
Youths who do not obtain or who are cast out of the sanctity ofjuvenile
court may face adult criminal punishment for their misdeeds. 23 For
thirty-six states this spectrum of adult criminal punishment includes
' See generally Echols v. State, 370 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963)(affirming
conviction and death sentence). Echols was executed on May 7, 1964. W. BOWERS, LEGAL
HOMICIDE 512 (1984).
1" W. BOWERS, supra note 85, at 419 and 513.
120 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1, 4 (May 1,
1986), lists fifty-six executions since January 1977. Since publication of that report, five
more persons have been executed. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1986, at 11, col. 4; id., June 20,
1986, at 11, col. 6; id., June 10, 1986, at 11, col. 4; id., May 21, 1986, at 11, col. 6; and id.,
May 16, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
121 See generally F. ZIMRJNG, supra note 94.
122 See S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM app. B (2d ed. 1985).
123 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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capital punishment.12 4 However, youths are usually given special protec-
tion even under capital punishment statutes.
Some states have maintained capital punishment as part of their
criminal sanctions for many, many years, but have never included
juveniles. Texas, in which the juvenile court age is seventeen, has
excluded such juveniles from capital punishment at least since 1897.125
Texas is a charter member of the core of death penalty states but, has
never seen fit to execute juveniles for their misdeeds.
Other states have more recently excluded juveniles from the coverage
of their capital punishment statutes. Currently, fourteen states 26 ex-
pressly exclude offenders under age sixteen, seventeen or eighteen from
their capital punishment statutes. Several states came to this decision
only recently. Ohio had seen two of its death penalty statutes struck down
as unconstitutional in the 1970's.127 The Ohio legislature then enacted a
new, fully-developed and presumably acceptable statute in 1981.128 For
the first time in its history, Ohio decided to prohibit capital punishment
for crimes committed while under age eighteen.129
Nebraska joined this legislative trend against capital punishment of
juveniles by amending its statute in 1982. The new Nebraska statute
prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed under the age of
eighteen. 130 In 1985, Colorado changed its capital punishment statute to
remove the possibility of the death penalty for individuals committing
crimes while under age eighteen. 131
Two other recent converts are Oregon and New Jersey. Oregon's 1985
capital punishment statute sets a minimum age of eighteen at time of
crime before it can be applied.132 New Jersey is the most recent example,
changing its capital punishment statute in January 1986, to exclude
capital punishment for those committing crimes while under age
eighteen.13
3
124 See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
125 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d)(Vernon Supp. 1982).
126 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
127 Ohio's 1954 capital punishment statute was declared unconstitutional in State v.
Leigh, 31 Ohio St. 2d 97, 285 N.E.2d 333 (1972), and Ohio's 1975 capital punishment statute
was declared unconstitutional in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
12' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929 (Page 1982)(effective Oct. 1, 1981). This statute has been
reviewed and upheld in two Ohio Supreme Court decisions: State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d
164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984); State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 209, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).
129 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Page 1982); Streib, Capital Punishment of
Children in Ohio: "They'd Never Send a Boy of Seventeen to the Chair in Ohio, Would
They?", 18 AKRON L. REv. 51 (1984).
130 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (1982).
' ' COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-10-103 (1985).
132 OR. REV. STAT. § 161-620 (1985).
133 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3f (West 1986)(P.L. 1985, ch. 478, approved Jan. 17, 1986).
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Thirteen other states establish a minimum age limit through either
their juvenile court waiver statutes or statutes giving concurrent or
exclusive jurisdiction to criminal court for capital murders committed by
offenders of a certain age or older.134 While not specifically addressing the
issue of minimum age for capital punishment, these measures provide a
clear indication of legislative intent to protect youthful offenders from the
harshness of criminal sanctions in general.
The capital punishment statutes in an additional six states expressly
require the sentencing body to consider, as a mitigating factor, the youth
of the offender. 135 While not a complete prohibition of capital punishment
of juveniles, the special treatment for youths is once again clear in the
legislative attitudes. Another fifteen jurisdictions prohibit all capital
punishment. 36
In sum, over 94% (48/51) of the jurisdictions either prohibit capital
punishment for all offenders (including juveniles), prohibit capital pun-
ishment for juveniles under a certain minimum age, or statutorally
require sentencing judges and/or juries to consider youth as a mitigating
factor in capital punishment decisions. Only three states 13 7 have no
legislative provisions for either establishing a minimum age for capital
punishment or requiring that youth be considered a mitigating factor in
the capital sentencing decisions. Note that only one of these three
states-Oklahoma-actually has sentenced any juvenile to death.138 This
overwhelming legislative rejection or disenchantment with capital pun-
ishment of juveniles is increasing and cannot be ignored.
C. Jury Sentencing Patterns
As mandated by recent decisions of the Supreme Court and by most
states' capital punishment statutes, juries deliberating on the choice
between the death penalty and life imprisonment for a convicted mur-
derer must expressly consider, as a mitigating factor, the youthfulness of
the offender. Executions of persons for crimes committed while under age
eighteen has always been somewhat rare, about 2.5% of all executions
since the 1890's.139 From this, one might well conclude that juries always
have been reluctant to sentence youths to death.
As Table 2 reveals, this reluctance is apparently increasing. Actual
executions of juveniles have fallen from 4.1% of total executions
(53/1,288) during the 1940's, to 2.4% of the total (6/255) from 1960
through July 1986.
134 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 32.
13' Delaware, Oklahoma and South Dakota. See supra note 44.
138 See infra Tables 3 and 4 and accompanying text.
139 See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
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The willingness of juries to sentence youths to death has decreased
dramatically in the period from December 1983 to July 1986. As Table 3
indicates, thirty-eight of the 1,289 (2.9%) persons on death row as of
December 1983 had committed their crimes while under age eighteen. 140
Almost three-fourths of them were age seventeen at the time of their
crimes, but nine were age sixteen, and two age fifteen.
During the next two and one-half years the total death row population
increased by over 500 persons but the number of juveniles actually
decreased. As of July 1986, only thirty-two of the approximately 1,800
(1.8%) persons on death row had committed their crimes while under age
eighteen. 141 The drop from thirty-eight to thirty-two juveniles on death
row is a 16% decrease in just twenty-seven months although there was a
42% increase (from 1,250 to approximately 1,770) in the adult death row
population during that time.
A comparison of the lists of names in Tables 3 and 4 reveals an even
more striking fact. Of the thirty-two juveniles on death row in July 1986,
twenty-five of them were simply holdovers from December 1983. While
thirteen persons on the December 1983 list had been removed from death
row (only three by execution), only seven new juveniles had been added
(Ward in Arkansas, Livingston in Florida, Cooper in Indiana, Rushing in
Louisiana, Wilkins in Missouri, Brown in North Carolina, and Thompson
in Oklahoma). These seven new juvenile death sentences comprise only
1% of the approximately 700 death sentences imposed during the two and
one-half year period from December 1983 to March 1986.
The only other list of juveniles on death row available for comparison
is that relied upon by the Supreme Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma.142
Dated May 1, 1981, this list included seventeen persons on death row for
crimes committed while under age eighteen. These seventeen juveniles
constituted 2.14% of the total death row population of 794 at that time.
Seven of those juveniles were still on death row in December 1983 and
three remained on death row in December 1984. This is further evidence
of a dramatic decrease in juvenile death sentences in the past few years.
Table 5 indicates that approximately 9.2% of intentional criminal
homicides were committed by persons under age eighteen from 1973
through 1983, assuming the arrests for those crimes are indicative of the
persons who actually commit them. While only a small percentage of
these criminal homicides were capital murders, it seems reasonable to
assume that juveniles commit roughly the same portion of capital
murders (9.2%) as their criminal homicide total. In striking contrast to
140 See NAACP DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (Dec. 20, 1983).
141 See Table 4, and NAACP DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH ROW, U.S.A. 1
(May 1, 1986). Approximately 180 persons have been added to death row in May, June and
July of 1986.
142 See Brief for Petitioner at 19a, app. E, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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TABLE 3
PERSONS ON DEATH ROW AS OF DECEMBER 1983
FOR CRIMES COMMITED WHILE UNDER AGE EIGHTEEN
Age at Time
State Prisoner of Offense Sex Race
Alabama Davis, Timothy 17 male white
Jackson, Carnal 16 male black
Lynn, Frederick 16 male black
Florida Magill, Paul 17 male white
Morgan, James 16 male white
Peavy, Robert 17 male black
Georgia Burger, Christopher 17 male white
Buttrum, Janice 17 female white
High, Jose 16 male black
Legare, Andrew 17 male white
Indiana Thompson, Jay 17 male white
Kentucky Ice, Todd 15 male white
Stanford, Kevin 17 male black
Louisiana Prejean, Dalton 17 male black
Maryland Johnson, Lawrence 17 male black
Trimble, James 17 male white
Mississippi Cannaday, Attina 16 female white
Jones, Larry 17 male black
Mhoon, James 16 male black
Tokman, George 17 male white
Missouri Lashley, Frederick 17 male black
Nevada Harvey, Frederick 16 male unknown
New Jersey Bey, Marko 17 male black
N. Carolina Stokes, Freddie Lee 17 male black
Oklahoma Eddings, Monty 16 male white
Pennsylvania Aulisio, Joseph 15 male white
Hughes. Kevin 16 male black
S. Carolina Roach, James Terry 17 male white
Texas Barrow. Lee Roy 17 male white
Hattie, Billy Joe 17 male unknown
Burns, Victor Renay 17 male black
Cannon, Joseph John 17 male white
Carter, Robert A. 17 male black
Garrett, Johnny 17 male white
Graham, Gary 17 male black
Harris, Curtis Paul 17 male black
Pinkerton, Jay K. 17 male white
Rumbaugh, Charles 17 male white
*Sources of data: NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCA'rIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH
Row, U.S.A. (Dec. 20, 1983); Brief for Petitioner at 19a App. E, Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); various communications with defense
attorneys and state officials.
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TABLE 4
PERSONS ON DEATH ROW AS OF JULY 1986
FOR CRIMES COMMITTED WHILE UNDER AGE EIGHTEEN
Age at Time
State Prisoner of Offense Sex Race
Alabama Davis, Timothy 17 male white
Jackson, Camel 16 male black
Arkansas Ward, Ronald 15 male black
Florida Livingston, Jesse J. 17 male black
Magill, Paul 17 male white
Morgan, James 16 male white
Georgia Burger, Christopher 17 male white
Buttrum, Janice 17 female white
High, Jose 16 male black
Legare, Andrew 17 male white
Indiana Cooper, Paula 15 female black
Thompson, Jay 17 male white
Kentucky Stanford, Kevin 17 male black
Louisiana Prejean, Dalton 17 male black
Rushing, David 17 male white
Maryland Trimble, James 17 male white
Mississippi Jones, Larry 17 male black
Tokman, George 17 male white
Missouri Lashley, Frederick 17 male black
Wilkins, Heath 156 male white
New Jersey Bey, Marko 17 male black
N. Carolina Brown, Leon 15 male black
Stokes, Freddie Lee 17 male black
Oklahoma Thompson, Wayne 15 male white
Pennsylvania Aulisio, Joseph 15 male white
Hughes, Kevin 16 male black
Texas Burns, Victor Renay 17 male black
Cannon, Joseph John 17 male white
Carter, Robert A. 17 male black
Garrett, Johnny 17 male white
Graham, Gary 17 male black
Harris, Curtis Paul 17 male black
*Sources of data: NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH
Row, U.S.A. (May 1, 1986); sources cited for Table 3, supra.
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TABLE 5
ARRESTS FOR MURDER AND NON-NEGLIGENT
MANSLAUGHTER, DISTRIBUTION BY AGE GROUPS, 1973-1983
Total
Year Arrests
1973 14,399
1974 13,818
1975 16,485
1976 14,113
1977 17,163
1978 18,755
1979 18,264
1980 18,745
1981 20,432
1982 18,511
1983 18,064
TOTALS: 188,749
Under Age Eighteen Age Eighteen and Over
Number Percentage Number Percentage
1,497 10.4% 12,902 89.6%
1,399 10.1%
1,573 9.5%
1,302 9.2%
1,670 9.7%
1,735 9.3%
1,707 9.3%
1,742 9.3%
1,858 9.1%
1,579 8.5%
12,419 89.9%
14,912 90.5%
12,811 90.8%
15,493 90.3%
17,020 90.7%
16,557 90.7%
17,003 90.7%
18,574 90.9%
16,932 91.5%
1,345 7.4% 16,719 92.6%
17,407 9.2% 171,342 90.8%
*Sources of data: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 179
(1983); id. at 176 (1982); id. at 171 (1981); id. at 200 (1980); id. at 196
(1979); id. at 194 (1978); id. at 180 (1977); id. at 181 (1976); id. at 188
(1975); id. at 186 (1974); id. at 128 (1973).
this 9.2% commission rate, juveniles have received a maximum of 2% to
3% of all capital sentences imposed over this time period.
Other factors may be partly responsible for this gross difference in
arrests and sentencing. Many of the juveniles arrested for murder and
non-negligent homicide are retained within the juvenile court which
typically has exclusive original jurisdiction. Of those transferred to or
directly charged in adult criminal court, at least some are not charged
with capital offenses. These and other factors combine with the reluc-
tance of criminal court juries to impose harsh criminal sanctions,
including capital punishment, upon juveniles.
Justice Brennan's view of the message from such jury reluctance is
compelling:
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When an unusually severe punishment is authorized for wide-
scale application but not, because of society's refusal, inflicted
save in a few instances, the inference is compelling that there is
deep-seated reluctance to inflict it.143
Such a deep-seated reluctance to sentence youths to death is manifested
dramatically by jury responses as reflected in their sentencing decisions.
D. Contemporary Standards of Decency
Criminal punishments which run contrary to popular sentiment can
and ought to be banned.1 44 Capital punishment for juveniles is such a
punishment in that it is in conflict with contemporary theory and
practice.' 45 An example of the reaction precipitated is the public outcry
which resulted from death sentences for a sixteen- and a seventeen-year-
old imposed back in the late 1960s. 146
Leaders of legal, criminological and social policy are coalescing to
oppose capital punishment of juveniles. The prestigious American Law
Institute excluded capital punishment for crimes committed while under
age eighteen from its influential Model Penal Code, concluding that
"civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of execution of chil-
dren."1 47 This position was also adopted by the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.1 48
In August 1983 the American Bar Association adopted as its formal
policy the following resolution:
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association opposes,
in principle, the imposition of capital punishment upon any
person for any offense committed while under the age of eighteen(18).149
This is the first time in the history of this prestigious organization that
it has taken any formal position on any aspect of capital punishment.
Upon learning of this ABA position, the Washington Post endorsed the
143 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring).
144 Id, at 331-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
141 But see Hill, supra note 3.
' See TIME, Feb. 2, 1968, at 64-65.
141 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980).
143 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW FEDERAL
CoDY § 3603 (1971).
149 See ABA Opposes Capital Punishment for Persons Under 18, 69 A.B.A. J. 1925 (1983);
Recommendation and Report to the ABA House of Delegates by the Section of Criminal
Justice, August 1983 (proposing that this resolution be adopted by the American Bar
Association).
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policy and urged it as a minimum requirement for those jurisdictions
which have capital punishment.15a
All European countries forbid capital punishment for crimes commit-
ted by individuals who are under the age of eighteen. 5 1 More than
three-fourths of the nations of the world (seventy-three of the ninety-
three reporting countries) have set age eighteen as the minimum age for
capital punishment.1 '5 2 The United Nations endorsed this position in
1976.153 Another indication of the present global attitude is the condem-
nation of the death penalty by Pope John Paul 1I, the first such position
by any Pope in history.154
Current public opinion polls suggest strong support for capital punish-
ment in general; the seventy-two percent in favor is the highest total
since 1936.1'55 However, recent polls of the general public have not asked
specifically about capital punishment of juveniles. The last indication
from the general public on this narrower issue was a February 1965
Gallup survey which reported that, while forty-five percent supported
capital punishment in general, only twenty-three percent favored it for
persons under twenty-one years of age.156 It seems reasonable to assume
that an even smaller percentage would have favored capital punishment
for persons under eighteen years of age.
A recent poll of lawyers confirms these findings. An American Bar
Association poll conducted in September 1984 revealed that sixty-eight
percent of lawyers favor capital punishment in general, down slightly
from sixty-nine percent in favor in 1983.157 In striking contrast, fifty-
three percent of the lawyers polled in 1984 were opposed to capital
punishment for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen.
5 8
While forty-one percent of male lawyers support capital punishment of
juveniles, only twenty-five percent of women lawyers support it. A
January 1985 poll of law students revealed that while sixty-one percent
of law students favor capital punishment in general, a majority of law
150 Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1983, § A, at 18, col. 1.
1 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY (1979); Note, Juvenile Offenders and the
Electric Chair: Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Firm Discipline for the Hopelessly
Delinquent?, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 344, 345 (1983).
... Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective, 56 J. CRiM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 397, 398-404 (1965).
15' See Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983).
114 N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1983, at 5, col. 2.
151 Id., Feb. 3, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
156 Erskine, The Pools: Capital Punishment, 34 PuB. OPINION Q. 290 (1970), cited in
Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1250
(1974).
117 Reskin, The Majority of Lawyers Support Capital Punishment, 71 A.B.A. J. 44 (Apr.
1985); Lawyers Strongly Favor the Death Penalty, 69 A.B.A. J. 1218 (Sept. 1983).
15s Id.
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students "oppose public executions and the execution of murderers
younger than 18."159 One could reasonably assume that these opinions of
lawyers and law students are not too different from the opinions of the
general public.
The issue in essence is not whether capital punishment is officially
authorized, but whether it is acceptable to society. Justice Brennan has
put the question most succinctly:
The question under this principle, then, is whether there are
objective indicators from which a court can conclude that contem-
porary society considers a severe punishment unacceptable. Ac-
cordingly, the judicial task is to review the history of a challenged
punishment and to examine society's present practices with
respect to its use. Legislative authorization, of course, does not
establish acceptance. The acceptability of a severe punishment is
measured, not by its availability, for it might become so offensive
to society as never to be inflicted, but by its use. 160
While still legislatively authorized by most United States jurisdictions,
capital punishment for juveniles is fast disappearing throughout the
world; such punishment is increasingly condemned by leaders of Amer-
ican criminal jurisprudence. As society matures, it develops new stan-
dards of decency to replace earlier, less informed standards. Our society's
and the world's contemporary standards of decency reject capital punish-
ment of juveniles and demand that we relegate that practice to our less
civilized past.
A decent society places certain absolute limits on the punish-
ments that it inflicts-no matter how terrible the crime or how
great the desire for retribution. And one of those limits is that it
does not execute people for crimes committed while they were
children.161
IV. MEASUREABLE CONTRIBUTION TO GOALS OF PUNISHMENT
Regardless of any controversy surrounding capital punishment in
general, this criminal sanction has been characterized by the Supreme
Court in its major opinions on the subject as achieving, to varying
degrees, the goals of retribution, general deterrence, and specific deter-
rence or incapacitation, while obviously rejecting the goals of reforma-
tion, rehabilitation and treatment of the offender. 16 2 Capital punishment
, Reskin, A Portrait of America's Law Students, 71 A.B.A. J. 43, 44 (May 1985).
16 Furman, 408 U.S. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., concurring).
'6' Bruck, Executing Juveniles for Crime, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1984, at 17, col. 1.
162 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
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cannot be justified, however, unless it makes a measureable contribution
to these goals since it is otherwise too harsh in comparison to long-term
imprisonment. A careful analysis of capital punishment of juveniles
reveals that no such measurable contribution toward these goals is made
in the case of these offenders. Capital punishment of juveniles is not
reasonably capable of advancing a legitimate state interest and thus
cannot be justified under the Constitution.
A. Retribution
In an earlier time, the United States Supreme Court made clear its
dissatisfaction with retribution as a justification for criminal sanctions:
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law."163
The goal of societal retribution or legal revenge achieved through
execution of an offender has since been referred to favorably by both
Chief Justice Burger and by Justice Stewart.164 In contrast, Justice
Marshall's view is that the eighth amendment precludes retribution for
its own sake. 165 All of these observations were made in cases involving
adults sentenced to death.
Retribution as a justification for criminal punishment, including the
death penalty, has been a widely-interpreted concept. 166 These interpre-
tations have been limited, according to the Supreme Court, to two having
legal import: the institutional revenge model and the just deserts
model. 167
The Supreme Court gave specific attention to the retribution issue in
Enmund v. Florida.168 Justice White, writing for the majority, expressed
the retribution issue in this manner:
As for retribution as a justification for executing Enmund, we
think this very much depends on the degree of Enmund's culpa-
bility-what Enmund's intentions, expectations, and actions
were. American criminal law has long considered a defendant's
intention-and therefore his moral guilt-to be critical to 'the
degree of [his] criminal culpability.'
For purposes of imposing the death penalty, Enmund's criminal
culpability must be limited to his participation in the robbery,
163 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
164 Furman, 408 U.S. at 394-95 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183
(Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
165 Furman, 408 U.S. at 342-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
i66 For an excellent summary of these various interpretations, see Note, supra note 3, at
1506-10.
167 Id.; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84.
'rs 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibil-
ity and moral guilt.169
Even if the execution of an adult for revenge or retribution is consti-
tutionally permissible, this justification of capital punishment loses its
appeal when the object of that righteous vengeance is a child. Juveniles
do not "deserve" harsh punishments in the same way that mature,
responsible adults might. Society does not feel the same satisfying,
cleansing reaction when a child is executed. Nonresponsible actors,
whether children, retarded adults or insane persons, by their very nature,
deserve, and usually receive, pity and treatment rather than the revenge
of an outraged society anxious to "kill them back."' 7 0 Experts in sentenc-
ing youthful offenders have concluded:
[A]dolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are
more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than
adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to
victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less
punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to con-
trol their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults.
Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's
fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family,
school, and the social system, which share responsibility for
development of America's youth.171
Execution of persons whose crimes were committed while under age
eighteen is not necessary to serve the ends of retribution. More than
sufficient retribution is achieved by sentencing such persons to long
prison terms.
B. General Deterrence
General deterrence from capital punishment has been the subject of
heated debate among criminology scholars.172 Various members of the
Supreme Court have disagreed as to the general deterrent effects of the
death penalty. Justices Brennan and Marshall have concluded that no
169 Id. at 800-01 (citations omitted).
170 See, e.g., H. Frazier, Juvenile Executions: The Folly of the Inevitable (Mar. 1985)(Pa-
per presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences)(avail-
able from the author, Professor Harriet C. Frazier, Criminal Justice Administration
Department, Central Missouri State University, Warrensburg, Missouri 64093).
171 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS,
supra note 5, at 7 (cited with approval in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11
(1982)). On the issue of youth crime being caused at least in part by such outside influences,
see particularly Note, supra note 3 at 1492-1503.
172 See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 93-185 (3d ed. 1982).
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verifiable general deterrent effect exists. 173 Justice Stewart acknowl-
edged the lack of clarity in the empirical evidence, but observed:
We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers,
such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has
little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death
penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are care-
fully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire, where the
possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus
that precedes the decision to act. 1
74
Justice Stewart's observations provide an excellent model for analyzing
any possible general deterrent effect from capital punishment for juve-
niles. Given these observations and premises, juveniles' perception of
death, and whether juveniles tend to act out of passion and impulse or
from cold, calculated decisions appear to be important considerations.
The Supreme Court has observed that young persons are generally
unable "to make sound judgments concerning many decisions."' 75 They
are going through "the period of great instability which the crisis of
adolescence produces."'1 76 Juveniles "generally are less mature and
responsible than adults."' 77 The Eddings majority favorably noted the
generally-accepted conclusions about the impulsiveness and irresponsi-
bility of juveniles.178
Most social scientists would agree that juveniles live only for today,
giving little thought to the future consequences of their actions.' 7 s
Adolescents are in a developmental stage, in defiance of danger and
death, and are attracted to games of chance with death from a feeling of
omnipotence. 110 Such well-known adolescent behavior was observed long
17' Furman, 408 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 353-54 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
174 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
175 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); accord, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603
(1979).
176 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
177 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115-16.
178 Id. at 115.
179 Kastenbaum, Time and Death in Adolescence, in THE MEANING OF DEATH 99 (H. Feifel
ed. 1959). In their news story, Children on Death Row, aired by the American Broadcasting
Corporation's World News Tonight on Apr. 15, 1985, correspondent Karen Burns inter-
viewed Wayne Thompson on Oklahoma's death row. Thompson was only 15-years-old at the
time of his crime. After Correspondent Burns reminded Thompson that he had been
sentenced to death for his crime, she asked Thompson if he had ever thought about the
death penalty before committing his crime. Thompson responded that he had not, saying
that his only thoughts then were of playing ball or just hanging around with his friends.
10 Fredlund, Children and Death from the School Setting Viewpoint, 47 J. SCHOOL HEALTH
533 (1977); Miller, Adolescent Suicide: Etiology and Treatment, 9 ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
327 (S. Feinstein, J. Looney, A. Schwartzberg & A. Sorosky eds. 1981).
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ago in juveniles sentenced to death: "On one occasion a boy showed
delight at being placed in the condemned cell, apparently because it gave
him status in the eyes of his fellow prisoners."11
Child development research reveals that ability to engage in mature
moral judgments develops significantly during middle and late adoles-
cence, reaching a plateau only after leaving school or reaching early
adulthood.182 Most adolescents have insufficient social experience for
making sound value judgments and understanding the long-range con-
sequences of their decisions.18 3 United States Supreme Court opinions
have recognized this universally understood principle: "[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them."18 4 All of this generally accepted informa-
tion about typical adolescent behavior leads to the conclusion that
juveniles do not commonly engage in any "cold calculus that precedes the
decision to act."185 The premises behind the assumed general deterrence
of the death penalty simply do not apply in any reasonable manner to
juveniles.
Even if a few juveniles might engage in a cold, premeditated calculus
before committing the act, they would know that even though capital
punishment might be authorized for juveniles the probability of their
ever receiving such punishment for their acts is almost nil. Without some
reasonable degree of certainty, any possible general deterrent effect
disappears. 18 6
C. Specific Deterrence and Incapacitation
Proponents of capital punishment, whether for juveniles or for all
offenders, point out that execution of an offender specifically deters and
incapacitates that individual offender. An executed prisoner will never
commit another murder. This justification for capital punishment of
juveniles is not so much incorrect, as simply too much punishment for too
little additional result.
81 Knell, supra note 112, at 202 n.8.
182 See, e.g., Rest, Davidson & Robbins, Age Trends in Judging Moral Issues: A Review
of Cross -Sectional Longitudinal, and Sequential Studies of the Defining Issues Test, 49 CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 263 (1978); M. RITTER, CHANGING YOUTH [N A CHANGING Socirv 83 (1980); E.
PEEL, THE NATURE OF ADOLESCENT JUDGMENT 131-34 (1971).
183 Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in M. HOFFMAN & L.
HOFFMAN, 1 REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 404-05 (1964).
184 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
185 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 186 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
186 See, e.g., H. BEDAU, THE CASE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (1985)(published by and
available from the American Civil Liberties Union, 132 W. 43rd Street, New York, New
York 10036).
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First, long-term imprisonment of young offenders affords society com-
parable protection against their future crimes. We know that murderers
generally are "extremely unlikely to commit other crimes either in prison
or upon their release."87 More specifically, we know that juvenile
murderers tend to be model prisoners and exhibit a very low rate of
recidivism when released.lsS If the goal of capital punishment is preven-
tion of future murders by these specific juveniles, long-term imprison-
ment is of comparable specific deterrent impact and negates the need for
capital punishment of juveniles.
D. Reformation, Rehabilitation, and Treatment
The inescapable conclusion is that capital punishment of juveniles
makes no measurable contribution to the constitutionally accepted goals
of capital punishment. This ultimate punishment does, however, totally
reject the one sentencing alternative normally though most appropriate
for young offenders-rehabilitation. 18 9 Execution irreversibly abandons
all hope of reforming a teenager and thus is squarely in opposition to the
fundamental premises of juvenile justice and comparable socio-legal
systems.
[I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with youth; that it is impossible to
make a judgment that a fourteen-year-old youth, no matter how
bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life.' 90
Capital punishment of our children inherently rejects humanity's
future, which rests with the habilitation and rehabilitation of today's
youth.19' Such a costly rejection should not be made if it makes no
measurable contribution to the goals of criminal justice in general, or to
capital punishment in particular.
V. ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND FREAKISH MANNER
To paraphrase Justice Stewart, death sentences for juveniles are cruel
and unusual in the same way that a juvenile being struck by lightening
187 Furman, 408 U.S. at 355 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1s Vitello, Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years
Since Kent v. United States, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 23, 32-34 (1976). See also D. HAMPERIAN, THE
VIOLENT FEW 52 (1978); T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 102-20 (1982).
189 See, e.g., People v. Hiemel, 49 A.D.2d 769,372 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1975). The court reduced
the murder sentence of a 16-year-old who had used the time in prison to become "a classic
example of the rehabilitation heights attainable within our existing penal system by an
inmate desirous of taking advantage of the educational facilities available." Id. at 770, 372
N.Y.S.2d at 731.
"' Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
... See generally Note, supra note 151.
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is cruel and unusual.192 Those few juveniles selected for capital punish-
ment are only a very small portion of all juveniles who commit criminal
homicides, and actual execution of such juveniles is so rare as to be
freakish. "[W]here life itself is what hangs in the balance, a fine precision
in the process must be insisted upon."193 Such a fine precision in capital
punishment of juveniles has not been and probably can never be
achieved. 194
Table 2 demonstrates just how arbitrary, capricious and freakish
juvenile executions have been. In the past century they have accounted
for only 2.5% of all executions. Since the 1940's juvenile executions have
dropped precipitously; only three have occurred in the past twenty years.
While execution of adults in the mid-1980s is no longer front-page news,
execution of a juvenile is so rare as to be most newsworthy.19 5
Perhaps the rarity of capital punishment of juveniles stems solely from
the rarity of criminal homicides by juveniles. Table 5 reveals that this
statement is not a sufficient explanation. Since 1973, when capital
punishment entered its modern era, juveniles have accounted for about
9.2% of the arrests for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. This has
been a steadily declining proportion from 10.4% in 1973 to 7.4% in 1983.
The proportion of actual executions of juveniles compared to all
executions has never even approached the proportion of arrests. Actual
sentencing to death of juveniles is extremely difficult to ascertain;
however, it also appears to be a much smaller proportion than actual
arrests of juveniles for criminal homicides. As of the end of 1983,
approximately 3,000 persons had been sentenced to death under post-
Furman statutes.' 96 The thirty-eight juveniles then on death row (Table
2) remained from approximately seventy-seven juveniles sentenced to
death under post-Furman statutes, 1972-1983.
If approximately seventy-seven of the 3,000 persons sentenced to death
were under age eighteen at the time of their crimes, this constitutes 2.6%
of the total death sentences during this period. No actual executions of
192 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
193 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978)(Marshall, J, concurring).
194 See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L. J. 908 (1982).
195 The execution of Charles Rumbaugh in Texas on September 11, 1985, prompted
indepth coverage by the news media. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at 8, col. 1
(four-column article on Execution for Juveniles: New Focus on Old Issue) id., Sept. 12, 1985,
at 11, col. 4 (two-column article on the execution of Rumbaugh); Nat'l Catholic Rep., Nov.
8, 1985, at 11-22 (forum section with six articles on Rumbaugh). Similar news media
coverage was devoted to the execution of James Terry Roach in South Carolina on January
10, 1986. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK Jan. 13, 1986, at 74 (two-column article); TIME, Jan. 20, 1986,
at 22 (one and one-half page article); N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at 22, col. 1 (editorial
opposing executions of juveniles).
196 Streib, Executions Under the Post Furman Capital Punishment Statutes: The Halting
Progression from "Let's do it" to "Hey, There Ain't no Point in Pulling so Tight", 15 RUTGERS
L.J. 443, 444 n.8 (1984).
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juveniles occurred since well before this period. In sum, juveniles ac-
counted for 9.2% of the criminal homicides, 2.6% of the death sentences,
and 0% of the actual executions. These figures are for the entire nation.
If the inquiry is confined to any one state, the numbers become so
miniscule as to become freakish. Moreover, the proportion of juveniles on
death row is dropping precipitously despite substantial increases in the
adult population on death row. 197
If the number of juveniles selected for death sentencing and possible
execution is considerably less than the number of juveniles who commit
capital crimes, how are those sentenced to death selected? The eleven
adults selected for actual execution from 1977 through 1983 were chosen
from a pool of approximately 3,000 sentenced to death and from the
171,342 adults who committed criminal homicides.19 8 A careful analysis
of those eleven adult cases has led to the conclusion that they were not
unique, and no rational basis could be discerned for their resulting in
actual execution. 99 Justice Brennan concluded that these adult execu-
tions have not been "selected on a basis that is neither arbitrary nor
capricious, under any meaningful definition of those terms."200
Extrapolating from these conclusions about adult executions, an even
stronger inference can be made in juvenile death sentences and execu-
tions. Their rarer and more random pattern of occurrence leaves no
alternative to the conclusion that they are most freakishly imposed. No
rational selection process can be determined, and one is left to conclude
that the basis of selection is arbitrary and capricious.
VI. AGE EIGHTEEN is MosT APPROPRIATE
If a constitutional line is to be drawn below which capital punishment
will not be permitted, what is the most appropriate age at which such a
line should be drawn? When do children become adults in our society for
purposes of legal duties and responsibilities? For the vast majority of
situations that age is eighteen.
Thirty-eight of the States now set age eighteen as the jurisdictional age
limit for their juvenile courts.20 1 These states exemplify the common
premise that adult responsibility for criminal acts normally should begin
at eighteen. Exceptions can and are made with waiver and concurrent
jurisdiction provisions but the dejure age is eighteen. 202
197 See supra Tables 3 and 4.
'9 See supra Table 5; Streib, supra note 196, at 443-44.
Streib, supra note 196, at 486.
20 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 60 (1984)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 S. DAVIS, supra note 122.
202 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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Ten of the fourteen states which expressly prohibit capital punishment
of youthful offenders have set that age as eighteen. 203 Texas has always
set the age at seventeen, which is the Texas juvenile court age limit.20 4
The minimum age for capital punishment in Nevada is sixteen, which
also coincides with their juvenile court age limit.205 The Model Penal
Code minimum age for capital punishment remains at eighteen, after age
fourteen was considered and rejected by the American Law Institute.20 6
Age eighteen is also the most common age of majority established in
American law for noncriminal purposes. For example, the twenty-sixth
amendment establishes the right to vote at age eighteen.
Internationally, age eighteen is the age chosen by the three quarters of
countries which prohibit capital punishment for juveniles. 207 Interna-
tional treaties, joined by the United States, also use the age eighteen as
the cutoff point.20
8
A second-level, less satisfactory choice would be to set the minimum
age for capital punishment at the juvenile court age for the particular
jurisdiction. This would give constitutional imprimatur for the current
practice in such states as Georgia, Nevada, New Hampshire and Texas,
all of which use age sixteen or seventeen because that is their juvenile
court age. However, that choice allows the present nonuniformity to
continue throughout the various jurisdictions. The states presumably
would be free to lower their juvenile court's jurisdictional age to an
extremely low age without constitutional ramifications on the capital
punishment issue. Further, the present range of minimum age from ten
to eighteen 20 9 would continue, leaving vastly different capital punish-
ment liability from state to state.
For these reasons, one minimum age limit for capital punishment
should be established. No age other than eighteen is as commonly used
for purposes similar to that at issue. Age eighteen is the only reasonable
choice for a minimum age for capital punishment.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Does the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit
capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age of
eighteen? The United States Supreme Court has avoided answering
directly this question in the past; however, it has provided a general
203 See supra note 34.
204 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d)(Vernon Supp. 1985).
205 NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.025 (1979).
' See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
207 Patrick, supra note 152, at 398-404.
201 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
209 See supra Table 1.
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analytical framework from which answers may be derived. The foregoing
analysis suggests that the most persuasive answer, given that general
analytical framework, is that capital punishment of juveniles is cruel
and unusual under the eighth amendment. This answer follows from a
step-by-step consideration of the supporting arguments for capital
punishment as they apply to adolescents. In this application, the force of
those supporting arguments either disappears, or in some cases suggests
that the threat of capital punishment may become an attraction to
death-defying adolescents.
Presently, the thirty-six capital punishment jurisdictions are not
acting uniformly. All must give the age of the offender great weight in
mitigation of the death penalty, and most expressly prohibit application
of their capital punishment statutes to their juveniles below at least some
minimum age. While some state courts have tried to resolve the consti-
tutionality question themselves, most simply have left the issue to the
state legislatures, which are increasingly considering amending their
statutes to join the trend against capital punishment of juveniles.
A uniform, nationwide policy is needed, and such a policy flows most
reasonably from the eighth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. It is beyond argument that American law would not permit capital
punishment for a very young child, say the three-year-old toddler who
shoots mommy to death with daddy's handgun. It is also settled that
American law does permit capital punishment for adults, say the thirty-
year-old who shoots his mother to death with his father's handgun. The
only issue, then, is the age at which to draw the line between these two
polar positions. At present, no universally accepted line exists, save the
line at age seven for criminal responsibility of any kind.21o
The line should be drawn at age eighteen, since that is by far the most
common age for similar restrictions and limitations. This line should
emanate from the eighth amendment, and should be imposed by the
United States Supreme Court.
210 A fundamental premise of Anglo-American criminal law is that persons under age
seven are conclusively presumed to be incapable of entertaining criminal intent and thus
can not have criminal liability imposed upon them. For the historical roots of this premise,
see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 23-24 (1792); 1 M. HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 25-28 (1736). For a recent American acceptance of this premise, see In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
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